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A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION:
AN ANTIDOTE TO THE EFFECTS OF THE DECISIONS IN
WHITE AND CITIZENS UNITED

PENNY J. WHITE* "

"[W]hat you see and heardepends a great deal on where you are standing."'
INTRODUCTION

For the first decade of my legal career, as a member of the bar, I held
members of the judiciary in uniform high esteem. I viewed judges as prestigious,
accomplished members of the bar who deserved the upmost respect and honor.
Even when judges ruled against my clients, I assumed that their rulings were
legally justified. Because they were judges, I imagined that they had developed
keener insight and wisdom that, in time, I too would acquire. If I had lost a case,
it must have been because I had missed something in my factual investigation or
failed to uncover or interpret relevant legal precedent. Even in my losses, I
generally came away impressed with the judgment of the judiciary, even though
it was inconsistent with my own. I largely attributed our different viewpoints to
my youth and inexperience, and I aspired to develop wisdom, insight, and
judiciousness.
In the second decade of my law life, I served as a member of this institution
that I so revered. I became a trial judge by running in a hotly contested, nonpartisan-in-name-only election in a multi-county judicial district, spanning more
than 1000 square miles of rural eastern Tennessee. I campaigned based on
qualifications, which included my educational background and my trial and
appellate experience as a small-town lawyer. I knocked on doors, rode on
unexceptional floats in Fourth of July parades, and ate tons of pancakes, country
ham, and spaghetti. Because that formula worked, giving me a landslide victory,
I determined, by virtue of my newly-acquired judicial wisdom, that the popular
election system for choosing judges worked well.
Within a few years, I was appointed by Tennessee's governor to the
intermediate appellate bench following a commission-based nomination. My
application was based on my record as a lawyer and trial judge. I did not need to
tell the commission that I was a woman, nor did they need reminding that only
one female had served as an appellate judge in the state's nearly 200-year history.
When the state's Democratic governor selected my name from the commission's
three nominees, he made history by appointing a thirty-four-year old woman. He

* Elvin E. Overton Distinguished Professor of Law and Director, Center for Advocacy and

Dispute Resolution, University of Tennessee College of Law.
This essay is largely derived from a presentation given on April 5, 2012, at the Indiana
University Robert H. McKinney School of Law at a Symposium entitled "Reflecting on Forty
Years of Merit Selection." I am grateful to the Indiana Law Review for both inviting me to
participate in the Symposium and for publishing these comments.
1. The entire quote from C.S. Lewis continues as follows: "It also depends on what sort of
person you are." C.S. LEWIs, THE MAGICIAN'S NEPHEW 136 (1955).
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also acquired the opportunity to fill the seat I vacated on the trial bench in a
completely Republican judicial district, undoubtedly a factor for him but a factor
about which I was blissfully oblivious.
The commission-based selection system in effect at the time was based
ostensibly on merit-a consideration of whether the applicant's background and
experiences prepared the applicant for the particular judicial position.2 I
perceived the system as quite appropriate, especially for an appellate judge whose
duty it was to review the trial court's application of the law. My satisfaction with
the merit-based system was magnified when I easily won a state-wide retention
election two years after my initial appointment without organizing a campaign
committee, raising any funds, or eating a single pancake.
With my new-found perspective as a (learned) appellate judge, I began to
favor merit appointment systems and retention elections over popular or partisan
elections forjudges. I embraced this point of view and praised the advantages of
a merit-based judicial selection system when I was again nominated by the
commission and appointed by the governor, this time to serve on Tennessee's
highest court. Again, the governor made history, appointing the second woman,
and the youngest person, to serve on the Tennessee Supreme Court, and again he
acquired the added benefit of creating a vacancy on the intermediate appellate
court which he had the opportunity to fill.
The retention election two years later-which I lost, making me the first and
only judge to lose a retention election in Tennessee-did not change my point of
view on the preferable and appropriate method for selecting judges, but it did
enable me to view the tasks of judging from a different perspective.3 I was no
longer a judge or lawyer. Nor did I remain a member of the inner circle or the
legal elite. Since I had chosen not to return to the practice of law, I was, in effect,
not even a member of the legal fraternity. As a result, I gained the advantage of
an outsider and was able to view the system objectively, rather than from my
particular, subjective point of view.
I have spent the last ten years standing at a distance, rather than shoulder to
shoulder with members of the bar or in robed isolation with members of the
bench. I still bear and relish the benefit of my prior experiences, but I now
endeavor to view the justice system in general and the tasks of judging in
particular from the unique perspective of those who the justice system exists to
serve, the general public.
Some obvious truths bear repeating. The justice system does not exist and
should not function for the benefit of lawyers; nor is its raison d'dtre the career
advancement,job satisfaction, orjob security ofjudges. The justice system exists
to provide a fair, orderly, and efficient method of resolving disputes in accord
with the rule of law. As John Adams noted in Article 29 of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights, "It is the right of every citizen to be tried by judges as free,

2. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102, repealed by 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 517, § 1 (current
version at TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102 (West 2012)).
3. See Christine Buttorff, WPLNNews FeatureTranscripts:JudicialRetention, NASHVILLE
PuB. RADIO (Aug. 3, 2006), http://wpln.org/?p=8050.
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'4
impartial, and independent as the lot of humanity will admit.
This essay undertakes to address, first, the effects that the United States
Supreme Court's decisions in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White5 and
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission6 have had on state courts.7
Second, the essay suggests that robust disqualification' provisions can serve as
a powerful antidote to the harmful effects of those two decisions, particularly
when judges view disqualification requests from the public's perspective.

I. THE DECISION IN WHITE, ITS AFTERMATH, AND EFFECTS
A 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White invalidated a provision of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct that
prohibited a judge or judicial candidate from announcing personal "views on
disputed legal or political issues."9 The decision was narrow in its scope"° and
application" but had wide-reaching effects, both on individual judges and on state

4. MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XXIX; see 4CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMs, THE WORKS OF JOHN
229 (1851).
5. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
6. 130 S. Ct. 875 (2010).
7. As was noted, this essay is drawn largely from a presentation given in conjunction with
the IndianaLaw Review's Symposium on merit selection. Because those in attendance were largely
familiar with White and Citizens United,I did not undertake to explain why, as I do briefly here,
those two decisions have had a negative effect on state courts, in my opinion.
8. Some have observed that, historically, judicial recusal referred to a judge's sua sponte
decision to withdraw from hearing a case, while judicial disqualification referred to the procedure
by which a litigant requested the judge to decline to hear the case. Clearly, this historical
distinction is no longer observed. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.11 (1972) (utilizing
the term "disqualification" to refer to both sua sponte withdrawal and withdrawal based upon a
ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

party's motion or request).

9. 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
10. The "announce" clause, Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) ofthe Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct,
in effect at the time of the White case was part of the 1972 Model Code of Judicial Conduct. See
White, 536 U.S. at 768. It provided that a "candidate for ajudicial office, including an incumbent
judge, shall not announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting MINN. CODE OFJUDICIALCONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000)).
11. Id.; see id.at 773 n.5, 786-87 (noting the limited number of states with provisions similar
to the "announce clause" in effect in Minnesota, and that the provision had been modified in the
revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct). Not only did the Court limit its grant of certiorari to one
of several issues raised, see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Republican Party of Minnesota v.
Kelly, 534 U.S. 1054 (2001) (No. 01-521), the Court also described the issue narrowly in the
opening sentence of the opinion ("whether the First Amendment permits the Minnesota Supreme
Court to prohibit candidates for judicial election in that State from announcing their views on
disputed legal and political issues"), and specifically confined the holding to the Minnesota
announce clause ("[T]he Minnesota Code contains a so-called 'pledges or promises' clause.., that
is not challenged here and on which we express no view."). White, 536 U.S. at 768-70 (internal
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courts as an institution.
Before the decision in White, most state judicial elections were low-key,
decorous events in which candidates talked about their educational backgrounds,
their professional experiences, and their military and community service. 2 This
was the norm in judicial elections, not only because judicial ethics rules restricted
political activity, but also because many judges envisioned themselves as a
unique class of elected officials insulated from rough-and-tumble politics and
high-dollar campaigns incumbent upon ordinary politicians.
The dispute that brought the White case to the Supreme Court was
emblematic of an emerging landscape in judicial elections. A candidate for the
Minnesota Supreme Court wanted to run on a platform which would include
criticism of some of the decisions of the Minnesota high court and statements of
his own views on the issues raised in those decisions.13 When the state ethics
board refused to endorse this type of campaigning, the candidate sued,
challenging the restrictions placed upon him and other candidates for judicial
office by the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct.14 The United States Supreme
Court limited its inquiry to only one of the challenged provisions 5 and ultimately
agreed that the provision restricting candidates for judicial office from
announcing their views on contested legal and political issues violated the First
Amendment.16
The success of those mounting the constitutional challenge in White
emboldened special interest groups and First Amendment advocates, while
simultaneously cowering lower federal courts, state supreme courts, and judicial
ethics bodies. 7 Special interest groups were now empowered to dispute judicial
candidates' claims that they were ethically prohibited from answering questions

citation omitted).
12. See James Bopp, Jr., Preserving Judicial Independence: Judicial Elections as the

Antidote to JudicialActivism, 6 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REv. 180, 180-81 (2007).
13. Gregory Wersal, a Minnesota lawyer, sought election to the Minnesota Supreme Court
on three occasions. See White, 536 U.S. at 768-69. He filed the first of three lawsuits seeking to
enjoin enforcement of several provisions of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct during his
1996 election bid. See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 996 F. Supp. 875, 875-76 (D. Minn.
1998). The original lawsuit in While, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), was filed inthe United States District
Court by Gregory Wersal, his wife, and the following additional plaintiffs: the Republican Party
of Minnesota, the Indian Asian American Republicans of Minnesota, the Republican Seniors, the
Young Republican League of Minnesota, the Minnesota College Republicans; the Campaign for
Justice, the Minnesota African-American Republican Council, the Muslim Republicans, Mark E.
Wersal, Corwin C. Hulbert, Michael Maxim, and Kevin J.Kolosky. See Brief for Petitioners Party
of Minn. et al. at *ii, Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 996 F. Supp. 875 (1998) (No. 05-521).
14. White, 536 U.S. at 769-70, 769 n.2.

15. Id. at 768-70.
16. Id. at 788.
17. See David E. Pozen, The Irony of JudicialElections, 108 COLuM. L. REv. 265, 297-98
(2008) (noting the many post- White challenges to judicial ethics rules).
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about their political and personal opinions. 8 The questionnaires became the new
weapon in state judicial races. 9 When candidates responded with answers that
mirrored the interest groups' views, the candidates received either direct
contributions or inclusion in the interest groups' issue advertisements or voters'
guides.2" Thus, the decision in White helped interest groups to simplify the task
2
of identifying which judicial candidates to support politically and financially. '
Though significant, it seemed that this ability to identify, publicize, and fund
like-minded candidates for judicial office did not satisfy special interest groups'
and first amendment advocates' appetite for involvement in state judicial
elections. These groups seemed to crave even greater influence in matters related
to judicial selection, as was evidenced by the uncompromising stance they took
against some candidates who chose not to respond to questionnaires. When
candidates refused to answer, the groups often juxtaposed their refusal to answer
with the stated views of cooperating candidates.22 Moreover, some groups
painstakingly differentiated between "decline to respond" and "refuse to
respond," designating "decline to respond" as indicating a candidate's
unwillingness to respond based on the candidate's perceived belief that state
ethics rules prohibited a response.23 When a candidate indicated that he or she

18. The questionnaires distributed to candidates forjudicial office often included a recitation
of the White holding along with an assurance that the questionnaire sought only the candidate's
views, and not his or her pledges, promises, or commitments. For example, a letter drafted by
James Bopp, plaintiff's counsel in White, and sent to Alaska judicial candidates by the Alaska
Right-to-Life Committee in 2002, contained this introduction:
The Alaska Right to Life [C]ommittee certainly recognizes that judicial candidates
should maintain actual and apparent impartiality [and] should not pledge or promise
certain results in particular cases that may come before them .... This questionnaire
is intended to elicit candidates' views on issues of vital interest to the constituents of the
Alaska Right to Life Committee without subjecting candidates answering its questions
to accusations of impartiality or requiring candidates to recuse themselves in future
cases.
POUND CIVIL JUSTICE INST., THE LEAST DANGEROUS BUT MOST VULNERABLE BRANCH: JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 15 n.130 (2010), available at http://www.

roscoepound.org/2007%20Pound°/20Forum%20Report.pdf (second and third alteration in
original).
19. Id. at 15.
20. Id.
21. See Mark S. Cady & Jess R. Phelps, Preserving the Delicate Balance Between Judicial
Accountability and lndependence: Merit Selection in the Post-White World, 17 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 343, 345, 358-60 (2008).
22. See, e.g., Camille M. Tribble, Awakening a Slumbering Giant: Georgia's Judicial
Selection System After White and Weaver, 56 MERCER L. REv. 1035, 1067-68 (2005) (noting how
one judge's refusal to answer specific questions in the Christian Coalition of Georgia survey put
the candidate at a disadvantage to his opponent, who chose to advertise his conservative
credentials).
23. For example, a questionnaire sent to candidates for judicial office in Kansas included a
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was not responding because of ethics rules, or based on specific advice from state
judicial bodies, the state judicial bodies frequently were sued.24
Based either on a misreading of White or a desire to avoid protracted and
expensive litigation with an uncertain result, some lower federal courts, state
supreme courts, and judicial ethics bodies unnecessarily dismantled or
discontinued enforcement of numerous other important restrictions on judges'
political speech and conduct,25 while other courts distinguished and upheld
limitations on political conduct by candidates for judicial office.26 The advocates
in White continue to challenge other provisions of the Minnesota Code of Judicial
Conduct following the remand from the United States Supreme Court.27 The
result of these efforts were mixed, with the-United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit striking some additional restrictions on political conduct in the
Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct,28 and upholding others,29 but by and large

paragraph describing the "decline to response" answer as follows:
This response indicates that I would answer this question, but believe that I am or may
be prohibited from doing so by Kansas Canon of Judicial Conduct 5A(3)(i) and (ii),
which forbids judicial candidates from making "pledges or promises of conduct in
office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office" or
"statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases,
controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court." This response also
indicates that I would answer this question, but believe that, if I did so, then I will or
may be required to recuse myself as a judge in any proceeding concerning this answer
on account of Kansas Canon 3E(l),which requires a judge or judicial candidate to
recuse him or herself when "the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1218 (D. Kan. 2006), vacated, 562 F.3d 1240
(10th Cir. 2009).
24. See, e.g., Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002); Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d at
1218-19; Ind. Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 463 F. Supp. 2d 879 (N.D. Ind. 2006), rev'd in part,
507 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2007); Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672
(E.D. Ky. 2004).
25. See, e.g., Weaver, 309 F.3d 1312; Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209; Duwe v. Alexander, 490
F. Supp. 2d 968 (W.D. Wis. 2007); Shepard,463 F. Supp. 2d 879; N. Dakota Family Alliance, Inc.
v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D. N.D. 2005); Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672.
26. See, e.g., Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2012); Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d
704 (7th Cir. 2010).
27. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 361 F.3d 1035, 1041 (8th Cir. 2004) (upholding
challenges to partisan-activities and solicitation restrictions in Minnesota Code of Judicial
Conduct), vacated, 416 F.3d 738, 744 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (affirming judgment for the
plaintiffs and holding that "the partisan-activities and solicitation clauses" violated the First
Amendment).
28. Id.at 1047-49.
29. See Wersal v. Sexton, 607 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (D. Minn. 2009), rev'd,613 F.3d 821 (8th
Cir. 2010) (holding the endorsement and solicitation clauses violated the First Amendment), and
rev'd, 674 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (upholding the constitutionality of the
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these ambiguous events have not led jurisdictions to reinstate or revisit their
eliminated restrictions.
Because ethical restrictions on judicial political speech and conduct have
been greatly diminished, the historical distinctions between judicial elections and
elections for executive and legislative offices have been significantly lessened.
Some suggest that the result is not only a more politicized state judiciary, but a
less respected one as well.3"
II. THE DECISION IN CITIZENS UNITED, ITS AFTERMATH, AND EFFECTS

With a simplified means of identifying judicial candidates' views on legal
and political issues, interest groups are better able to filter funds to support likeminded candidates of their choice.3 Even before the stopgaps on campaign
expenditures were lifted by the United States Supreme Court's 2010 decision in
Citizens United v. FederalElection Commission, the White decision and other
factors had prompted a deluge of spending in state judicial elections.33 For

endorsement, personal solicitation, and political organization solicitation clauses of the Minnesota
Code of Judicial Conduct). Wersal's most recent suit challenged restrictions on political
endorsements and solicitations. The district court ruled against him, but a panel ofthe Eight Circuit
reversed. Ultimately, an en banc panel of the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court ruling.
30. As Justice O'Connor noted in her concurring opinion in White, "Even ifjudges were able
to suppress their awareness of the potential electoral consequences of their decisions and refrain
from acting on it, the public's confidence in the judiciary could be undermined simply by the
possibility that judges would be unable to do so." Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S.
765, 789 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor cited a 2001 national opinion poll
that found "that 76% percent of registered voters believe that campaign contributions" affect
judicial decision-making and that two-thirds of voters believe that judges give favorable treatment
to donors. Id. at 790 (citing GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH, INC., JUSTICE AT STAKE
CAMPAIGN & AM. VIEWPOINT, JUSTICE AT STAKE FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 4-5 (2001),
availableat www.justiceatstake.org/files/JASNationalSurveyResults.pdf).
31. See supra text accompanying notes 17-24.
32. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
33. See JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE
& NAT'L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 20002009: DECADE OF CHANGE 1-2 (2010), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/
cms/JASNPJEDecadeONLINE_8E7FD3FEB83e3.pdf [hereinafter SAMPLE ET AL., JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 2000-2009]; JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE & NAT'L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
2006: How 2006 WAS THE MOST THREATENING YEAR YET TO THE FAIRNESS AND IMPARTIALITY
OF OUR COURTS-AND How AMERICANS ARE FIGHTING BACK 15 (2007), available at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/NewPoliticsofludicialElections2006-D2A2449B77C
DA.pdf; DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE
& NAT'L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004:
How SPECIAL INTEREST PRESSURE ON OUR COURTS HAS REACHED A "TIPPING POINT"--AND How
TO KEEP OUR COURTS FAIR AND IMPARTIAL 13-14 (2005), availableat http://www.justiceatstake.
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example, from 1990-1999, the decade before the 2002 White decision, judges
seeking seats on America's fifty state supreme courts spent a combined total of
over $83 million dollars.3 4 In the near-decade that followed, 2000-2009, that
amount nearly tripled, to $206.9 million,35 with the increase being virtually across
the board. 36 This spending trend continued and expanded in 2010 and 2011, with
37
many states experiencing their most expensive state supreme court races ever
and with enormous amounts of out-of-state money being invested in a retention
race in Iowa.3"
While the decision in White provided a means by which special interest
groups could identify judicial candidates who shared the groups' political
ideologies, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Citizens Unitedenabled
corporations and labor unions to invest their funds and vastly influence the
election of state court judges as well.39 In the Citizens United decision, the Court
invalidated portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, which
restricted corporate and union campaign expenditures.40 In so doing, the Court
overruled two
decisions4 that had upheld modest restrictions on campaign
42
expenditures.
Although the dispute in Citizens United arose from expenditures in an

org/media/cms/NewPoliticsReport2004_83BBFBD7C43A3.pdf.
34. SAMPLE ET AL., JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000-2009, supra note 33, at 1-2.
35. Id.
36. Twenty of the twenty-two states that elect their supreme courts witnessed their costliest
judicial race ever in the last decade. Id. at 8.
37. Illinois Supreme Court Justice Thomas Kilbride spent nearly $3 million to retain his seat
on Illinois' high court in a down-state race in 2011. ADAM SKAGGS ET AL., JUSTICE AT STAKE
CAMPAIGN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE & NAT'L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS, THE NEW
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

2009-10: How

SPECIAL INTEREST

"SUPER

SPENDERS"

THREATENED IMPARTIAL JUSTICE AND EMBOLDENED UNPRECEDENTED LEGISLATIVE ATTACKS ON

COURTS 8 (2011), available at http://newpoliticsreport.org/site/wp-content/
uploads/2011/10/JAS-NewPolitics2010-Online-Imaged.pdf. Candidates for the Michigan Supreme
Court in 2010 spent just over $2 million, while special interest groups spent an additional $6.8
million to $8.8 million. Id. at 3-4. Candidates for the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed to public
financing, which limited the amounts their respective campaigns could spend, but special interest
groups spent an additional $3.6 million in the race. Id. at 11.
38. Id. at 8. Chief Justice Marsha Temus, Justice David Baker, and Justice Michael Streight
of the Iowa Supreme Court were defeated in a retention election in November 2010.
39. See ADAM SKAGGS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, BUYING JUSTICE: THE IMPACT OF
CITIZENS UNITED ON JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 1-2 (2010), available at http://www.brennancenter.
org/page/-/publications/BCReportBuyingJustice.pdf?nocdn=l
[hereinafter SKAGGS, BUYING
AMERICA'S

JUSTICE].

40. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886-87 (2010).
41. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (per curiam), overruledby
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876; Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990),
overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876.
42. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886.
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executive branch campaign 43 and dealt explicitly with federal campaign finance
laws,' the decision eliminated a distinction between individual and corporate
expenditures, recognized the First Amendment rights of corporations and
unions,45 and rejected the notion that independent expenditures, including those
made by corporations and unions, could give rise to corruption or the appearance
of corruption.46 Thus, the decision's ill effects will not be limited to federal
elections.
Both the majority47 and the dissent acknowledged the decision's broader
implications for state judicial elections, but the dissent more aptly forecast the
concern:
[T]he consequences of today's holding will not be limited to the
legislative or executive context. The majority of the States select their
judges through popular elections. At a time when concerns about the
conduct of judicial elections have reached a fever pitch, the Court today
unleashes the floodgates of corporate and union general treasury
spending in these races.48
As was true in the aftermath ofthe decision in Republican PartyofMinnesota
v. White, courts have already begun expanding the reach of the Citizens United
holding. In SpeechNow.org v. FederalElection Commission, for example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit invalidated a cap on
campaign contributions to independent political groups who spent money in
direct support of candidates for federal office.49 The SpeechNow case involved
restrictions on campaign contributions, not campaign expenditures, as were at
issue in Citizens United, but the D.C. Circuit applied the rationale of Citizens
United to a different set of facts and invalidated restrictions, not on campaign
expenditures, but on campaign contributions.5"
Even before the full effects of the decision in Citizens United are felt, the
public believes that the entanglement of money and special interest is having a

43. Id. (evaluating the legality of the airing of a movie regarding Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton when she was a candidate for the Democratic Party's presidential nomination). Id. at 887.
44. Id. at 886-87 (raising challenges to the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002).
45. Some commentators have referred to the decision as bestowing "personhood" on
corporations and unions. See, e.g., Atiba R. Ellis, Citizens Unitedand Tiered Personhood,44 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 717, 720-21 (2011).
46. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908.

47. Id. at910-11.
48. Id. at 968 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citation
omitted).
49. 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
50. Id. at 692-93, 695 ("Because of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Citizens United
v. FEC, the analysis is straightforward. There, the Court held that the government has no anticorruption interest in limiting independent expenditures .... Given this analysis from Citizens
United, we must conclude that the government has no anti-corruption interest in limiting
contributions to an independent expenditure group such as SpeechNow.").
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toxic effect on state courts. 51 Recent studies show that more than three-fourths

of the public believes that campaign contributions influence judicial decisionmaking.52 When asked to quantify the influence, 89% of those surveyed said that
money buys influence in the courts, and 90% of the surveyed voters agreed that
a judge should not preside over a case involving any of his or her campaign
contributors.5 3 Equally disconcerting is that 80% of the public expresses concern
with the influence that special interest groups exert over state courts. 4
Accordingly, when public trust in the judicial process is undermined, the public
will become disenfranchised, disengaged, and disinterested in the courts.55

51. Professor Zephyr Teachout, an expert on political corruption, provides a significant
argument about the dangers corruption creates for the Constitution. See Zephyr Teachout, The
Anti-CorruptionPrinciple,94 CORNELLL. REV. 341,342 (2009). Teachout argues that the Citizens
United Court ignored the Framers' concerns with preventing corruption. She posits that the
Framers of the American Constitution were acutely concerned about political corruption and that
they largely viewed the Constitution as a safeguard against political corruption. Id. at 347. To curb
the potential for political corruption, defined as the "self-serving use of public power for private
ends," Teachout argues that the Framers regulated elections, imposed term limits, limited
acceptance of foreign gifts, outlined impeachment provisions, and provided for the separation of
powers. Id. at 373-74. With regard to the Judicial Article, Professor Teachout notes that "[m]any
of the Article III discussions concerned ways to ensure the independence of the judiciary. The
judiciary, it was argued, needed to be independent of both 'the gust of faction' and corruption.
Thus, in determining the method of selection of judges, the Framers were concerned with
dependency and corruption .... The determination thatjudges were to hold their office during good
behavior meant the absence of corruption. Similarly, thejury protection came in part from the anticorruption urge.... Likewise, inferior courts were established in part due to anti-corruption
concerns." Id. at 368-69 (footnotes omitted).
52. See SAMPLE ET AL., JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000-2009, supra note 33, at 68 (figure 33).
Additionally, in an October 2011 survey, only 3% of the public expressed a belief that campaign
contributions have "no influence" over judges' decisions. NationalRegistered Voters Frequency
Questionnaire, 20/20 INSIGHT LLC, at Q6 (Oct. 10-11, 2011), available at http://www.
justiceatstake.org/media/cms/NPJE201 ipoll 7FE4917006019.pdf [hereinafter 20/20 Survey].
53. SKAGGS, BUYING JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 4. See 20/20 Survey, supra note 52, at Q6
(96% of surveyed voters believe campaign contributions have either a "great deal,""some," or "just
a little" influence on a judge's decisions involving those contributors); Memorandum from Stan
Greenberg, Chairman & CEO of Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, Inc., & Linda A. DiVall,
President of Am. Viewpoint, to Geri Palast, Exec. Dir. of Justice at Stake Campaign (Feb. 14,
2002), available at http://justiceatstake.org/media/cms[PollingsummaryFINAL_9EDA3EB3B
EA78.pdf.
54. See SKAGGS, BUYING JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 4; Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 962 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 623-24 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (per curiam)).
55. To illustrate, see Gregory C. Pingree, Where Lies the Emperor's Robe? An Inquiry into
the Problem of JudicialLegitimacy, 86 OR. L. REV. 1095, 1098 (2007).
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III. FINDING A SILVER LNING
Although the decisions in White and Citizens United lionized the First
Amendment, not all of the justices who joined to form the majority opinions
completely disregarded the adversaries' concerns about the effect that unfettered
political speech and unlimited campaign expenditures would have on state courts.
In both cases, Justice Kennedy, author of a concurring opinion in White and the
majority opinion in Citizens United, addressed these concerns, but he cautioned
that fear of the effects of political speech and campaign expenditures could not
be allowed to suppress the exercise of important First Amendment freedoms. 56
Rather than restrict important speech rights, Justice Kennedy suggested that
robust judicial disqualification rules could be used to ameliorate the feared
In so doing, Justice Kennedy, in essence, embraced judicial
effects.57
disqualification as an antidote to the harms occasioned by an unyielding First
Amendment.
While the First Amendment would not tolerate restrictions on political speech
and campaign expenditures, states could articulate standards of judicial conduct
that advanced the state's interest in assuring "citizen's respect for judgments
[which] depends in turn upon the issuing court's absolute probity."5 8 "Explicit
standards of judicial conduct provide essential guidance for judges in the proper
discharge of their duties and the honorable conduct of their office."5 9 In his
concurring opinion in White, Justice Kennedy counseled states to "adopt recusal
standards more rigorous60 than due process requires, and censure judges who
violate these standards.,
Justice Kennedy's support for robust recusal provisions in White acquired
added significance in light of his majority opinion, as well as Chief Justice
Robert's dissenting opinion, in Caperton v. A.T Massey Coal Co., a case in
which judicial recusal was actually at issue. 6' In Caperton, the Court held that
due process requires recusal when "there is a serious risk of actual bias-based
on objective and reasonable perceptions-when a person with a personal stake
in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the
judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign
when the case was pending or imminent ' 62 such as existed in the case before the
Court. 63 Although the dissenting justices were extremely critical of the Caperton

56. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910; Republican Party ofMinn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765,793
(2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
57. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910; White, 536 U.S. at 793-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
58. White, 536 U.S. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 794.
60. Id.
61. 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009).
62. Id. at 884.
63. A newly elected judge on West Virginia's highest court refused to recuse himself and
ultimately voted to reverse a $50 million jury verdict against a company whose chair, president, and
chief executive officer had donated more than two-thirds of the judge's campaign's total funds and
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holding' and predicted that the probability of bias standard would in fact
diminish public confidence in the system, even the dissenting opinions endorsed
the freedom of states to adopt broad recusal rules.65
Perhaps based on this apparent consensus, the four dissenting justices in
Citizens Unitedsuggested that the Capertonholding undermined Citizen United's
position." Justice Kennedy curtly disposed of any implication of incompatibility
between the litigant's due process rights recognized in Caperton and the First
Amendment rights of individuals, corporations, and unions to expend funds in
political campaigns.67 Although Justice Kennedy matter-of-factly observed that
the connection between a contributor and a candidate forjudicial office could not
be eliminated by banning or curbing political speech, he reiterated that states
could require judicial disqualification. 68
If a silver lining exists, it is in the recognition that states may mandate robust
disqualification standards, informed by the states' interest in enhancing the
public's confidence in the courts.69 Strong disqualification provisions can
counterbalance the unfortunate effects of the decisions in Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White70 and Citizens United v. FederalElection Commission.71
Consistent application of those strong provisions will curtail the incentive of
special interest groups to invest in judicial races. Even the potential that a judge
may disqualify herself will likely cause groups to reevaluate their investments. 7
Shouldering Justice Kennedy's suggestions, the American Bar Association 1

spent an additional half of a million dollars supporting the judge's candidacy. Id. at 872-73.
64. See id. at 902 (Roberts., C.J., dissenting) ("I believe that opening the door to recusal
claims under the Due Process Clause, for an amorphous 'probability of bias,' will itself bring our
judicial system into undeserved disrepute, and diminish the confidence of the American people in
the fairness and integrity of their courts."); see also id. at 902-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (lamenting
that "the principal consequence of today's decision is to create vast uncertainty with respect to a
point of law .... This course was urged upon us on grounds that it would preserve the public's
confidence in the judicial system ..... The decision will have the opposite effect.").
65. Id. at 892-93 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito).
66. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 967-68 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor).
67. Id. at 910 (majority opinion) (observing that "Caperton ... is not to the contrary....
Caperton's holding was limited to the rule that the judge must be recused, not that the litigant's
political speech could be banned.").
68. Id.
69. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (noting that "[j]udicial integrity is, in consequence, a state interest of the highest
order.").
70. Id. at 768.
71. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886.
72. In August 2011, the American Bar Association House of Delegates passed Resolution
107, which "urge[d] states to establish clearly articulated procedures for: [j]udicial disqualification
determinations; and [p]rompt review ... of denials of requests to disqualify." A.B.A. STANDING
COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, A.B.A., RESOLUTION 107 (revised July 22, 2011) (adopted by
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and some states have undertaken to revise their judicial disqualification
provisions.73 The Tennessee Supreme Court, for example, recently adopted new
judicial disqualification rules, with both substantive and procedural changes,74
which have been widely applauded and positively received." Other states have
attempted recusal reform only to face internal dissension. In Wisconsin, for

the ABA House of Delegates on Aug. 8-9, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/judicialindependence/report 107_judicial disqualification.a
uthcheckdam.pdf. Resolution 107 also recommended that states provide for a prompt review of
a denied disqualification motion, conducted by a different judge and that states in which judges
are elected adopt provisions requiring disclosures of direct and indirect campaign support and
guidelines regarding disqualification ofjudges presiding over cases involving litigants or lawyers
who have contributed support. Id. Following the passage of Resolution 107, the ABA Standing
Committees on Judicial Independence and Ethics and Professional Responsibility conducted public
hearings on proposed amendments to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. See, e.g., A.B.A.
STANDING COMM. ON ETHIcs & PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY & A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON PROF'L

DISCIPLINE, ProposedAmendments to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct RegardingJudicial
Disqualifications,A.B.A. (Feb. 3, 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/migrated/cpr/ethics/20111228_scepr draftproposed amendments and hearingnoticede
c201 .authcheckdam.pdf.
73. According to the American Judicature Society, nine state supreme courts have adopted
judicial disqualification rules that address campaign contributions in light of and consistent with
the decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). Those states include:
Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee,
Washington. See JudicialDisqualificationBased on Campaign Contributions,AM. JUDICATURE
Soc'y 5-10 (last updated Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.ajs.org/ethics/pdfs/Disqualification
contributions.pdf.
74. The revised Tennessee Rules of Judicial Conduct retain their previous standard, which
requires disqualification of a judge whose "impartiality might reasonably be questioned," but
expand the non-exclusive list of circumstances which may require disqualification. TENN. Sup. CT.
R. 10, Rule 2.11 (A). Specifically, disqualification is required when "[t]he judge knows or learns
by means of a timely motion that a party, a party's lawyer, or the law firm of a party's lawyer has
made contributions or given such support to the judge's campaign that the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned." Id. Rule 2.11 (A)(4). Comment 7 clarifies that the fact of
contribution "does not of itself disqualify the judge," but requires consideration of a number of
detailed factors. Id. Rule 2.11 cmt. 7. Additionally, the rule requires disqualification when the
judge "has made a public statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion,
that commits or appears to commit the judge to reach a particular result or rule in a particular way
in the proceeding or controversy." Id. Rule 2.11 (A)(5).
The procedural changes in the Tennessee rules effect both trial and appellate judges. The
revised Tennessee rules require trial judges to rule "promptly by written order," which, in the event
the motion is denied, includes the grounds for denial. TENN. SUP. CT. R. 10, Rule 2.11 (D); TENN.
SUP. CT. R. 10B § 1.03. Appellate review of denied disqualification motions is de novo and
expedited. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B § 2.01.
75. See, e.g., Editorial, A Reform for Fair Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2012, at A22,
availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/30/opinion/a-reform-for-fair-courts.html.
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example, a majority of the Supreme Court declined to adopt rules requiring
recusal in cases involving endorsements, lawful campaign contributions,
independent expenditures, or "issue advocacy communications" made by
individuals or entities regardless of the amount or content and notwithstanding
the involvement of the individuals or entities in the proceedings before the
76
Similarly, in Nevada, justices rejected a proposal that would have made
court.
disqualification mandatory when ajudge received contributions totaling $50,000
or more from a party or lawyer during the previous six-year period."
Still other states have faced legal challenges based on proposed modifications
to their judicial disqualification standards. First Amendment advocates maintain
that disqualification rules
have merely shifted unconstitutional regulations of speech from an ex
ante prohibition of speech during judicial campaigns to an ex post

76. Petitions were filed requesting the Wisconsin Supreme Court to amend the judicial
disqualification rules applicable to disqualification based on campaign contributions. A petition
filed by the League of Women Voters of Wisconsin sought to require disqualification for
contributions over $1000 within the preceding two years of the election. See Petition ofthe League
of Women Voters of Wis. Education Fund to the Wis. Supreme Court,.at 3, In re Creation of Rules
for Recusal When a Party or Lawyer in a Case Made Contribution Effecting a Judicial Campaign
(amended July28) (No. 08-16), availableat http://www.wicourts.gov/supreme/docs/0816petition.
pdf. Petitions filed by the Wisconsin Realtors Association and the Wisconsin Manufacturers and
Commerce took the position that disqualification should never be required based on a lawful
campaign contribution. Petition for Supreme Court Rule of the Wisconsin Realtors Assoc. to the
Justices of the Wis. Supreme Court at 1,In re Amending the Rules of Judicial Conduct (Sept. 30
2008) (No. 08-25), available at http://wicourts.gov/supreme/docs/0825petition.pdf; Petition for
Supreme Court Rule of the Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce to the Justices of the Wis.
Supreme Court at 1, In re Amending the Code of Judicial Conduct (Oct. 16, 2009) (No. 09-10),
availableat http://wicourts.gov/supreme/docs/0910petition.pdf. The court adopted two rules that
provided that judges "shall not be required to recuse" based solely on endorsements, campaign
contributions, independent expenditures, or "issue advocacy communication" including
endorsements, contributions, expenditures, or issue advocacy communications from or by
individuals or entities involved in the proceeding. Wis. Sup. CT. RULES 60.04(7); 60.04(8). For
a full discussion of the petitions and the adoption of the rules, see Legislative Report: Special
Legislative Committee Studies JudicialDisciplineand Recusal, Wis. CivIL JUST. COUNCIL, INC.,
http://www.wisciviljusticecouncil.org/policy-project/legislative-report-special-legislativecommittee-studies-judicial-discipline-and-recusal/#_ftn3 (last visited Nov. 28, 2012).
77. Editorial, Can Justice Be Bought?, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011, at A34, available at
Nevada Judicial Code
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/opinion/16thul.html?_r-l.
Commission Issues ProposedAmendments, ADMIN. OFFICE (Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.nevada
judiciary.us/index.php/nj ccnews/ 130-nevada-judicial-codecommission-issues-proposedamendments; 2009 Nevada Code of JudicialConduct, WASHOE CNTY. BAR ASSOC. (Feb. 2010),
http://www.wcbar.org/documents/JudicialCode.Feb201 0.Handouts.pdf; Order, In re Amendment
of the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct, ADKT 427 (Nev. 2009), available at http://www.leg.
state.nv.us/courtrules/SCRCJC.html.
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formulation that requires judges to disqualify themselves for statements
they have made, all the while continuing to reach the same speech
protected in [White]: the right of judges and judicial candidates to
announce their views.7"
These advocates argue that forcing judges to disqualify themselves
unconstitutionally chills protected political speech and conduct.79
The recent United States Supreme Court decision in Nevada Commission on
Ethics v. Carriganappears to undermine this argument."0 At issue in Carrigan
was a conflict-of-interest recusal provision of the Nevada Ethics in Government
Law.8 l Carrigan, a public official, was censured for voting on a matter involving
Carrigan challenged the
his close friend and campaign manager.82
it violated the First
that
arguing
law,
Nevada
the
constitutionality of
8 3 The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with Carrigan's argument and
Amendment.
held "that voting by an elected public officer on public issues is protected speech
under the First Amendment."' Several states, as amici, urged a reversal of the
Nevada Supreme Court's holding.85 They argued that disqualification rules are
"a measured response to the credibility gap between the public and its public
officials."8 6 To their delight, a unanimous Supreme Court agreed. 7
Justice Scalia, writing for seven members of the Court, upheld the
constitutionality of the Nevada ethics provision based on the history and tradition
of recusal rules in the United States. 88 Because these rules have long been a part
of the American tradition and history, their constitutionality is presumed. 9 And

78. James Bopp, Jr. & Anita Y. Woudenberg, An Announce Clauseby Any OtherName: The
UnconstitutionalityofDiscipliningJudges Who Failto Disqualify Themselves for ExercisingTheir
Freedom to Speak, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 723, 724 (2007) (internal footnotes omitted).
79. Id. at 739 (submitting that "[r]ecusal for announcing one's view is unprecedented").
80. Nev. Comm'n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343 (2011).
81. Id.at 2346. The specific provision prohibited a public officer from "vot[ing] upon or
advocat[ing] the passage or failure of ...a matter with respect to which the independence of
judgment of a reasonable person in his situation would be materially affected by [his or her]
commitment in a private capacity to the interests of others." Id.(quoting NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 281A.420(3) (West 2011)).
82. Carrigan v. Comm'n on Ethics, 236 P.3d 616, 618-19 (2010) (en bane), rev'd, Nev.
Comm'n on Ethics, 131 S.Ct. at 2352.
83. Nev. Comm'n on Ethics, 131 S. Ct. at 2347.
84. Carrigan,236 P.3d at 621.
85. See Brief of Florida et al., Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 2-3, Carrigan v.
Comm'n on Ethics, 236 P.3d 616 (2010) (No. 10-568) (2011 WL 771327 at **2-3).
86. Brief of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
at 6, Carrigan v. Comm'n on Ethics, 236 P.3d 616 (2010) (No. 10-568) (2010 WL 4852436 at *6).
87. Justices Kennedy and Alito filed concurring opinions. Carrigan, 131 S.Ct. at 2352
concurring); id at 2354 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
(Kennedy, J.,
88. Id.at 2346-48 (majority opinion).
89. Id.at 2347-48 (noting that "[a] universal and long-established tradition of prohibiting
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although the case before the Court concerned legislative recusal rules, the
majority opinion explicitly referenced longstanding judicial disqualification
statutes. 90 Most noteworthy were two observations, one by Justice Scalia and the
other by Justice Kennedy. Justice Scalia gratuitously commented that "there do
not appear to have been any serious challenges to judicial recusal statutes as
having unconstitutionally restricted judges' First Amendment Rights"9' and
differentiated between rules that restrict exercising the functions of one's office
(be that voting as a legislature or ruling as a judge) and rules that restrict speech.9"
Justice Kennedy meticulously distinguished between the role of legislators and
the role of judges and the corresponding breadth of applicable disqualification
rules:
The differences between the role of political bodies in formulating and
enforcing public policy, on the one hand, and the role of courts in
adjudicating individual disputes according to law, on the other, may call
for a different understanding of the responsibilities attendant upon
holders of those respective offices and of the legitimate restrictions that
may be imposed upon them.93
IV. URGING A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION

These aspects of the Carriganrationale should provide an adequate defense
to constitutional challenges against strong state judicial disqualification rules.94
But even if the decision in Carrigan is ultimately confined to its facts, robust
judicial disqualification rules can remain a strong antidote to the toxic effects of
White and Citizens United if individual judges consider the broad view of the
public when ruling on disqualification motions.
Perhaps human nature causes judges to view disqualification motions as a
challenge to their personal integrity. Certainly, no judge, and arguably no person,
enjoys being told that he or she is, or appears to be, unfair. It is understandable,
therefore, that some (perhaps, many) judges take umbrage at the filing of
disqualification motions. These motions may track the language ofjudicial ethics
rules and allege that the judge's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 95
Judges may be offended by the allegations that they believe challenge their good

certain conduct creates a strong presumption that the prohibition is constitutional: Principles of
liberty fundamental enough to have been embodied within constitutional guarantees are not readily
erased from the Nation's consciousness.") (quoting Republican Party of Mirn. v. White, 536 U.S.
765, 785 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
90. Id. at 2348-49.
91. Id. at 2349.
92. Id. at 234 9 n.3.
93. Id. at 2353 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
94. See Keith Swisher, Recusal, Government Ethics, and Superannuated Constitutional
Theory, 72 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2012).
95. TENN. SUP. CT. R. 10, Rule 2.11(A).
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name and reputation.96 They may view the motion as suggesting that they lack
the most essential characteristic of good judging-the ability to judge a case
impartially.
But judges must battle these natural instincts to consider the motions as
personal attacks 97 or criticisms and instead reflect on the underlying purpose for
judicial disqualification motions-to preserve public trust and confidence in the
judiciary.9 8 Judges should strive to set aside personal reactions to disqualification
motions and view the motions, instead, in light of their underlying purpose,
against a backdrop of history,99 and in the face of modem attempts to undermine
the integrity of state courts.
When motions for disqualification are viewed as a vehicle for upholding the
court's integrity, rather than as a personal attack or criticism of an individual
judge, the importance of taking into account the broader perspective of the public
becomes apparent. The view from outside the system, from the non-judge,
focuses on preserving the integrity of the system. That preservation, rather than
the individual judge's desire to remain free from challenge, is the overriding
concern.
Viewing disqualification methods from the public's perspective is consistent
with some of the longstanding per se disqualification rules. A good example is
Rule 2.11, which prohibits a judge from sitting in cases in which a person "within
the third degree of relationship to" the judge is a party or in cases in which the

96. Unfortunately, this was the attitude expressed by the Chief Justice in his dissenting
opinion in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 898, 902 (2009) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (asking "Does the judge get to respond to the allegation that he is probably biased, or
is his reputation solely in the hands of the parties to the case?" and predicting that an upsurge in
recusal motions would tarnish judges' reputations and diminish respect for the judicial system).
97. 1do not intend to suggest that all disqualification motions are meritorious. I know that
many are not and that some lawyers attempt to "game" the system, but I adhere to views I have
expressed previously-that the ramifications of filing spurious disqualification motion are great
enough to deter most lawyers from doing so.
98. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 5 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355; S.
Rep. No. 93-419, at 5 (1973) (noting that the federal judicial disqualification statute "is designed
to promote confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process").
99. Not only are judicial disqualification rules ingrained in American history and tradition,
they were also an established part of common-law and civil law jurisprudence. See, e.g., Richard
E. Flamm, History of and Problems with the FederalJudicial DisqualificationFramework, 58
DRAKE L. REv. 751, 753 (2010) (noting that Congress passed "the first federal judicial
disqualification statute in 1792," but that "the notion that judges should stand fair and detached
between the parties who appear before them did not originate with Congress"); John P. Frank,
Disqualificationof Judges, 56 YALE L. J. 605, 610 (1947) (noting that judges were disqualified at
common law only for direct pecuniary interests, which "took many forms"); Harrington Putnam,
Recusation, 9 CoRNELL L. Q. 1, 3 (1923) (citing to the Codex of Justinian, dated 529-534 A.D.)
(noting that "[t]he chief ground of recusation in continental practice ... has been on the salutary
doctrine that the personal attitude of the judge toward the litigant, or toward the cause itself shall
be above all suspicion").
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judge previously presided in another court.100 These per se disqualification
provisions do not exist to disqualify judges who are actually biased. Rather, they
are based on appearances-the appearance that is created when a judge presides
over a case in which a relative is involved, including a relative whom the judge
may not know, or the appearance that is created when a judge presides over a case
in which he has previously ruled, including a case that the judge does not
recollect. 1
Disqualifications based on per se rules rarely seem to trigger negative
reactions. The affected judge is not offended; nor is he or she viewed in a
negative light. Custom and practice simply dictate that judges will. step aside in
these cases. In the same manner, and within time, custom and tradition will
adhere to other disqualification motions, eliminating negative connotations and
replacing the unhelpful.undertones with a healthy acceptance of their beneficial
purpose.
We are reminded with every new survey that the most important source of
public dissatisfaction with the justice system is its perceived unfairness. 2 This
source of dissatisfaction becomes clear when we step back and view the system
from the perspective of someone who is outside the legal system. The public can
almost never know with certainty that a decision is unfair. They will rarely have
sufficient information about the legal or factual background to make that
determination, but they definitely sense when the system seems unfair. It is that
perception of unfairness that promotes disrespect and erodes public trust and
confidence in the courts. So from the perspective of those for whom the system
exists-those who the system is designed to serve-the single most important
concern is that the justice system not only be fair but also appear to be fair.
Justice is as it is perceived to be.
When ajudge receives a disqualification motion, the tendency is for the judge
to ask, "Am I biased?"; "Can I be fair?"; or "Did I do something wrong?" These
are the wrong questions posed from the wrong perspective. Rather, the judge
should ask: "Will the integrity of the system suffer if I hear this case?"; "Will the

100. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (A)(2), (6) (2011).
101. See id. R. 2.11 (A)(6) (setting out per se disqualification rules).
102. Research indicates, for example, that the perception of, and thus respect for, the judiciary
is influenced not only by the nature of the outcome of its work-that is, the public's agreement or
disagreement with court decisions-but also by the degree to which the system is perceived to be
procedurally and substantively fair. "People who believe specific decisions are wrong, even
wrongheaded, and individual judges unworthy of their office" will continue to accept judicial
decisions "if they respect the court as an institution that is generally impartial, just, and competent."
Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the UnitedStates Supreme Court:A
Preliminary Mapping of Some Prerequisitesfor Court Legitmation of Regime Change, in
FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 275 (Joel B. Grossman & Joseph Tanenhaus eds., 1969). See
James L. Gibson, Understandings of Justice: InstitutionalLegitimacy, ProceduralJustice, and
PoliticalTolerance, 23 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 469, 471 (1989); Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski,
ProceduralJustice,InstitutionalLegitimacy,andtheAcceptanceof UnpopularU.S. Supreme Court
Decisions: A Reply to Gibson, 25 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 621, 621-22 (1991).
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public's impression of justice be affected negatively if I decide the issue?"; and
"Will my sitting as a judge in this case undermine the public's trust and
confidence in the judiciary?" At the risk of being overly unsophisticated, the
proper inquiry is no more than slightly varied from the ancient Hippocratic oath,
often quoted as simply "first, do no harm."' °3 When ruling on motions to
disqualify, a judge's duty should be first and foremost to do no harm to the
institution of justice.
Not long ago, a judge who was at the center of a disqualification controversy
confronted me after I had written an article addressing his situation. He scolded
me for not calling him and getting his point of view on the disqualification
motion. My response was respectful, but candid: "Judge, I'm sorry, but it's just
not about you!" Judges should resist viewing disqualification motions as
personal accusations because doing so promotes the judges' personal interests
above much more substantial concerns about the integrity of the justice system.
CONCLUSION: UNDERTAKING THE "WORK OF A LIFETIME"

As the judicial selection landscape shifts, so too must the perspectives from
which judges view disqualification motions. This shift in perspective is a key
step to inoculating the justice system against the ill effects of the decisions in
White and Citizens United. As states struggle to draft strong, yet enforceable
disqualification standards, judges too must struggle to promote the public good
over their personal concerns. Robust disqualification standards will act as a
disincentive only to the extent that judges rigorously apply those standards.
Justice Kennedy noted in White that "[t]o comprehend, then to codify, the
essence ofjudicial integrity is a hard task."" But he cautioned that the enormity
and complexity of the task "should not dissuade the profession."'0 5 States who
undertake that hard task have the value of a diversity of opinion on which

103. For additional background on the Oath, see Lisa R. Hasday, The HippocraticOath as
Literacy Text: A DialogueBetween Law and Medicine, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 299,
301, 313 (2002). The oath dates back to the fourth or fifth century B.C. and is generally thought
of as an oath taken by members of the medical profession promising to perform their practices
ethically. Id. at 301. Other professional communities have required similar codes. Kim
Economides, then a Professor of Legal Ethics at the University of Exeter School of Law, posed this
question in the London Times: "Should there not be some kind of Hippocratic Oath for lawyers so
that, in the future, lawyers' commitment to justice and the rule of law is more than purely
rhetorical?" Lawyers Take a Stand, TIMES (London), May 17, 2008. Similarly, the Society of
Ethical Attorneys at Law requires its members to take an oath similar to Hippocratic Oath,
requiring its members to promote "honesty, clarity and integrity in the practice of law." Oath,
Soc'Y OF ETHICAL ATTORNEYS AT LAW, http://www.societyofethicalattomeys.org/index.php?
p=oath (last visited Nov. 29, 2012).
104. Republican Party ofMinn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765,793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 794.
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standards should be adopted, but these divergent viewpoints do not dilute the
benefit of consensus on the most fundamental issue before us: state courts must
maintain public trust and confidence in order to play their vital role in our
democracy. Yet even the most well-defined code will fail without judges who
embark upon
the "work of a lifetime" in a continual struggle for judicial
°6

integrity.

106. Id.

